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In contrast, physicists believe that events with extremely small probability cannot occur. In this paper, we show that to get a consistent formalization of this belief, we need, in addition to the original probability measure, to also consider a maxitive (possibility) measure.
I. PHYSICISTS ASSUME THAT INITIAL CONDITIONS AND VALUES OF PARAMETERS ARE NOT ABNORMAL
To a mathematician, the main contents of a physical theory is the equations. The fact that the theory is formulated in terms of well-defined mathematical equations means that the actual field must satisfy these equations. However, this fact does not mean that every solution of these equations has a physical sense. Let us give three examples: Example 1. At any temperature greater than absolute zero, particles are randomly moving. It is theoretically possible that all the particles start moving in one direction, and, as a result, a person starts lifting up into the air. The probability of this event is small (but positive), so, from the purely mathematical viewpoint, we can say that this event is possible but highly unprobable. However, the physicists say plainly that such an abnormal event is impossible (see, e.g., [5] ). Example 2. Another example from statistical physics: Suppose that we have a two-chamber camera. The left chamber is empty, the right one has gas in it. If we open the door between the chambers, then the gas would spread evenly between the two chambers. It is theoretically possible (under appropriately chosen initial conditions) that the gas that was initially evenly distributed would concentrate in one camera. However, physicists believe this abnormal event to be impossible. This is an example of a "micro-reversible" process: on the atomic level, all equations are invariant with respect to changing the order of time flow (t ---t). So, if we have a process that goes from state A to state B, then, if while at B, we revert all the velocities of all the atoms, we will get a process that goes from B to A.
However, in real life, many processes are clearly irreversible: an explosion can shatter a statue but it is hard to imagine an inverse process: an implosion that glues together shattered pieces into a statue. Boltzmann himself, the 19th century author of statistical physics, explicitly stated that such inverse processes "may be regarded as impossible, even though from the viewpoint of probability theory that outcome is only extremely improbable, not impossible." [1] .
Example 3. If we toss a fair coin 100 times in a row, and get heads all the time, then a person who is knowledgeable in probability would say that it is possible -since the probability is still positive. On the other hand, a physicist (or any person who uses common sense reasoning) would say that the coin is not fair -because if it is was a fair coin, then this abnormal event would be impossible.
In all these cases, physicists (implicitly or explicitly) require that the actual values of the physical quantities must not only satisfy the equations but they must also satisfy the additional condition: that the initial conditions should not be abnormal.
Comment. In all these examples, a usual mathematician's response to physicists' calling some low-probability events "impossible", is just to say that the physicists use imprecise language.
It is indeed true that the physicists use imprecise language, and it is also true that in the vast majority of practical applications, a usual probabilistic interpretation of this language perfectly well describes the intended physicists' meaning. In other words, the probability language is perfectly OK for most physical applications.
However, there are some situations when the physicists' intuition seem to differ from the results of applying traditional probability techniques:
From the probability theory viewpoint, there is no fundamental difference between such low-probability events as a person winning a lottery and the same person being lifted up into the air by the Brownian motion. What we plan to show, in this paper, is that there is one more area where possibility measures can be helpful in physical applications: in describing the physicists' intuition about rare events, an intuition that is somewhat different from its traditional probabilistic description.
II. A SEEMINGLY NATURAL FORMALIZATION OF THIS

IDEA
The above-mentioned property of being "not abnormal" ("typical") has a natural formalization: if a probability p(E) of an event E is small enough, i.e., if p(E) . po for some very small threshold po, then this event cannot happen.
In other words, there exists the "smallest possible probability" po such that:
if the computed probability p of some event is larger than Po, then this event can occur, while
. if the computed probability p is < po, the event cannot occur.
For example, the probability that a fair coin falls heads 100 times in a row is 2-100, so, if the threshold probability po satisfies the inequality po > 2-100, then we will be able to conclude that such an event is impossible.
III. THE ABOVE FORMALIZATION OF THE NOTION OF "TYPICAL" IS NOT ALWAYS ADEQUATE The problem with this approach is that every sequence of heads and tails has exactly the same probability. So, if we choose po > 2-100, we will thus exclude all possible sequences of 100 heads and tails as physically impossible. However, anyone can toss a coin 100 times, and this proves that some such sequences are physically possible.
The threshold should depend on the complexity of the property: for simple properties, it should be larger, but for complex properties (e.g., described by a specific sequence of Os and Is), it should be smaller. Historical comment. This problem was first noticed by Kyburg under the name of Lottery paradox [10] : in a big (e.g., statewide) lottery, the probability of winning the Grand Prize is so small that a reasonable person should not expect it. However, some people do win big prizes.
IV. RELATION TO NON-MONOTONIC REASONING Lottery paradox has been known for several decades, and many solutions have been proposed to resolve this paradox.
One possible solutions comes from the fact that in deriving the above paradox, we used classical logic, a logic that is monotonic in the following sense: once we made a logical conclusion, this conclusion remains valid no matter what new knowledge we acquire. In classical logic, if we increase the set of facts and rules, the set of conclusions can only increase.
Our objective, however, is to formalize expert reasoning (specifically, physicists' reasoning), and it is known that the expert reasoning is, in general, not monotonic. For example, if we know that birds normally fly, and we see a bird, then we normally conclude that this bird can fly. However, if it later turns out that this bird is an abnormal bird, e.g., a penguin, that we take back our original conclusion and conclude that this particular bird does not fly.
It is known that if we take the non-monotonic character of expert reasoning into consideration, then the lottery paradox stops being a paradox, it becomes simply one of the nonmonotonic features of expert reasoning; see, e.g., Poole [II], [12] (see also [8] ). Specifically, if we use formalisms like default logic that have been designed to capture commonsense reasoning, we can explain the above paradox.
From the pragmatic viewpoint, this approach is very satisfactory; however, from the foundational viewpoint, the existing description of commonsense non-monotonic reasoning is still being developed, better and better semantics of non-monotonic reasoning -in particular, reasoning about what is typical and what is normal -are appearing all the time.
What we plan to do in this paper is restrict ourselves only to the description of rare events. For this narrow specialized area of reasoning, we will provide a formalization of the notions of "typical" and "normal", and thus, in effect, we provide a specific non-monotonic logic -a logic is reasonably final (and thus, does not depend on the fact that the general description of non-monotonic reasoning is still far from being final).
Comment. It is worth mentioning that there is an interesting alternative approach to the above solution of the lottery paradox: namely, we can, alternatively, conclude that our intuition is simply wrong and that events with very small (even 0) probability can actually happen.
This alternative approach was pioneered by such wellknown specialists in philosophical foundations of probability theory as K. Popper and B. de Finetti (see, e.g., [3] ). This approach is currently being successfully developed by G. Coletti, A. Gilio, R. Scozzafava, W. Spohn, and others (see, e.g., [2] and references therein). Within this alternative approach, there is a natural hierarchy of zero probability events (induced by the corresponding conditional probabilities), and this hierarchy also leads to a maxitive measure! Since our objective is to formalize the physicists' intuition, not to reject it, we do not follow this alternative approach.
However, the very fact that both approaches lead to the same formalism of maxitive measures makes us think that maybe there is a deep relation and similarity between these two approaches.
V. NEW IDEA "Abnormal" means something unusual, rarely happening: if something is rare enough, -it is not typical ("abnormal"). Let us describe what, e.g., an abnormal height may mean. If a person's height is > 6 ft, it is still normal (although it may be considered abnormal in some parts of the world). Now, if instead of 6 ft, we consider 6 ft 1 in, 6 ft 2 in, etc., then sooner or later we will end up with a height ho such that everyone who is taller than ho will be definitely called atypical, abnormal (to be more precise, a person of abnormal height). We may not be sure what exactly value h experts will use as a threshold for "abnormal" but we are sure that such a value exists.
While every person whose height is > ho is definitely atypical, a person whose height is below ho is not necessarily typical: he may be atypical because of some other properties.
For example, we may consider people atypical because of an unusual weight. Similarly, there exists a weight wo such that everyone whose weight exceeds wo will be called atypical.
Let us express the above idea is general terms. We have a universal set, i.e., the set U of all objects that we will consider. In the above example, U is the set of all people. Some of the elements of the set U are abnormal (in some sense), and some are not. Let us denote the set of all elements that are typical (not abnormal) by T.
On the set U, we have several decreasing sequences of sets Al D A2 .. An ...with the property thatnAn =0. n In the height example, A1 is the set of all people whose height is > 6 ft, A2 is the set of all people whose height is > 6 ft 1 in, A3 is the set of all people whose height is > 6 ft 2 in, etc.
In the weight example, A1 is the set of all people whose weight is > 150 lb, A2 is the set of all people whose weight is > 160 lb, A3 is the set of all people whose weight is > 170 lb, etc.
We know that for each of these sequences, if we take a sufficiently large n, then all elements of An are abnormal (i.e., none of them belongs to the set T of not abnormal elements). In mathematical terms, this means that for some integer N, we have AN n T = 0.
Let us describe this idea in precise terms [8] . This method is often used in physics, if, e.g., we have the expression of x as a sum of the infinite series (e.g., Taylor series in perturbation methods). Then, if, e.g., second order terms are negligibly small, we neglect quadratic and higher order terms, and use the linear expression as an approximation to the desired solution (see, e.g., [6] ).
If we are solving the equation f(x) = y with known y, then we stop when f (Xk) becomes close enough to y -i.e., when dx(f(x), y) < 3 for some 3 > 0.
Both stopping criteria can be viewed as particular cases of the following general definition: Definition 2. Let X be a definable metric space, and let S be a definable set of convergent sequences of X.
. Let The two above-described criteria correspond to c(x, x') = dx (x,x') and c(x) = dx (f(x), y). Proposition 3. Let c be a stopping criterion. Then, for every e, there exists a 3 > 0 such that if a sequence {xn} is not abnormal, and c(xk, . . ., Xk+d_ 1) < 6, then Xk is £-accurate.
Proof. As A, we will take the set of all sequences for which for some k, c(xk, .. . ,Xk+d-1) < 2-n and dx(xk,x) > s.
Clearly, An D A,+,.
Let us show that the intersection nAg is empty. Indeed, suppose that the sequence {Xk} belongs to this intersection.
This means that for every n, there exists a k(n) such that C(Xk(n) X. .. ,Xk(n)+d-1) < 2' and dx(xk(,),x) > s. If some value k is equal to k(n) for infinitely many n, this means that C(Xk,... I Xk+d1) < 2-n for all n 
VIII. WHEN RESTRICTED TO TYPICAL OBJECTS,
MANY NUMERICAL PROBLEMS BECOME ALGORITHMICALLY DECIDABLE Another possible application involves constructive real numbers, i.e., real numbers x for which we can -by computations (like with 7r) or by measurement -obtain, for every k, a 2-k_ approximation rk (for which Irk -xI < 2-k). We can have several constructive real numbers x, X/ .. . I X/ corresponding to different measurable physical quantities. Based on the results of more and more accurate measurements of these numbers, we would like to check whether the actual values satisfy a desired property; e.g., whether for the vector X de (x, x', ... , x"), we have f(X) > 0 for a given multi-variate function f. (Sometimes, we would like to check whether f(X) > 0, this is equivalent to checking whether g(X) > 0, for g(X) def -f(X).) In general, it is algorithmically impossible to decide whether a given constructive number is non-negative or not; see, e.g., [9] .
We can (easily) prove that there exists a k such that for every not abnormal vector X, either f(X) > 0 or f(X) <-2 . In practice, the function f(X) is continuous, hence there exists I such that if we know X with accuracy 2-1, then we can determine f(X) with accuracy 2-(k+l) -and thus, tell whether f(X) > 0 or whether f(X) < 2-k. So, if we know that the actual vector is typical, then, after computing (or measuring) it with accuracy 2-1, we will be able to tell whether f(X) > 0 or f(X) < 0. Thus, for typical values, the generally undecidable problem becomes algorithmically decidable. (Of course, the catch is that we do not know 1 -it depends on the selection of a typical set T.)
We can now use this result to find out, for a given spatial accuracy e, where a given constructive function f(X) attains it maximum on a given box [xl, T1 x ... x [xv,xT]. Indeed, we can divide the box into sub-boxes of size < r, and algorithmically compute the maximum of f over each subbox [9] . When a function is typical, the difference between its maxima on two constructive subbox is also typical -so we can algorithmically decide whether the two maxima are equal or one is larger -and thus find out for which subbox the maximum is the largest; this is where the maximum is located -so have determined this location with the given spatial accuracy E.
IX. ADDITIONAL IDEA: DEGREE OF TYPICALNESS
In the main text, we largely considered a set of typical elements T of a given universal set. It makes sense to also consider typical elements of different subsets of T: e.g., in addition to a typical height of a person, it may be reasonable to consider a typical height of a child or a typical height of a person living in Russia. For that, we must assume that we for some universal set U, we have a mapping that assigns, to every L-definable set A C U, a non-empty set T(A) that is a set of typical elements for A.
In the above text, we implicitly assumed that every object a E A can be classified as either a typical element of A or an abnormal element of A. According to common sense, however, being typical or abnormal may be a matter of degree. How can we extend our description to this "degree of typicalness"?
Typical means, e.g., that if we have no prior information about a real number, that it is reasonable to assume that this real number is not abnormal. Later on, we may learn that there are some features of this particular situation that make it atypical; however, if all we know is that the object is atypical, we should still be able to conclude that it a "typical" element of the class of abnormal objects, "typical exception" -crudely speaking, an abnormal object of degree 1. Alternatively, it may turn out to be an abnormal object is an exception even among exceptions -i.e., abnormal of degree at least 2, etc.
How can we describe this formally? We have shown that once a logico-mathematical theory L that formalizes the physical knowledge is fixed, in a larger (meta-)theory M, we can talk about definable and typical objects. In this metatheory M, we can define what it means for a set T(A) C A to be the set of all typical (not abnormal) elements of the set A.
As we have mentioned, to fully describe physicists' reasoning, we should assume that one such set T(A) was selected for all (or at least for some) definable sets A. The model of the original theory L + this selection provides, in effect, a model of an extended theory £', in which, in addition to the original basic properties, relations, and basic functions, we also have a new basic property -that a is a typical element of A. In this extended theory £', the term "typical" is part of the theory, thus, e.g., the set T(A) is explicitly definable in the new theory -while it was not definable in the original physical theory L.
On top of this extended theory L', we can also build a new meta-theory M', and in this new meta-theory, we can talk about the typical elements of sets which are definable in L'. In particular, in this new meta-theory M', we can talk about typical elements of the set Ab(A) def A \ T(A) of all abnormal elements. The set T (Ab(A) ) of all such typical elements consists of "typical exceptions", i.e., abnormal elements of degree 1. Remaining elements, i.e., elements of def the set Ab2(A) = Ab(A) \T(Ab(A)), are elements which are exceptions even among exceptions, i.e., they are abnormal of degree 2.
Similarly, we can defined a yet another meta-theory and talk about elements of degree at least 3, etc. The general definition of the set Abk(A) of all elements abnormal of degree > k is Ab1 (A) = A\ T(A) and Abk+l = Abk(A) \ T(Abk(A)). The degree of abnormality of an abnormal element a e A can then be defined as the largest integer k for which a E Abk(A).
X. BEYOND MAXITIVE MEASURES
We have mentioned that we also want to exclude events A of low probability. We have also mentioned that the threshold probability of an event -below which this event is impossible -should depend on the complexity of this event.
In probability theory, it is usually sufficient to consider events belonging to the Borel a-algebra, i.e., the smallest aalgebra generated by open and closed subsets of the original set U. It also makes sense to only consider probability measures defined on this a-algebra; for every such event A and probability measure p, the probability p(A) is well-defined.
Let c(A) > 0 denote this threshold "complexity" of event A. Then, for a probability measure p, if p(A) < c(A), then A is impossible, i.e., T(p) n A = 0, where T(p) denotes the set of typical elements corresponding to p. Definition 3. Let p be a definable probability measure, and let c be a function that maps every definable set into a positive real number We say that a set T(p) is consistent with c and p if T(p)nA = Ofor every definable set Afor which p(A) < c(A).
What are the conditions on the "complexity measure" c under which a consistent set T(p) exists for every p? It turns out that these conditions can be formulated in terms of the following property: Definition 4. We say that a sequence of sets {Xi } is Uindependent iffor all i, Xi g U Xi.
To Proposition 4.
Iffor every definable probability measures p, there exists a non-empty set T(p) that is consistent with c and p, then for all U-independent definable families {X}, we have Ec(Xi) < 1. * Let 0 < E < 1. Iffor every definable probability measures p, there exists a set T(p) that is consistent with c and p and for which p(T(p)) > 1 -e, then E c(Xi) < E for all U-independent definable families {Xi} for which Uxi # U. Since UXi #8 U, there exists an element xo V UXi. Pick 6 > 0 so small that we still have s/(1 + 6) > E, and take p({xi}) = c(Xj)/(1 + 6) and p({xo}) = 1 -Ep({xi}). Here, p(Xi) = p({xi}) = c(Xj)/(1 + 6) < c(Xi) hence T(p) n xi= 0. So, T(p) C X \ UXi. However, p(UXj)= Ep({xi}) = s/(1+6), so p(UXi) > E hence p(T(p)) < 1-6 -a contradiction with our assumption.
Finally, let E c(Xi) < E for all U-independent families {Xi}. Let us show that as T(p), we can take whatever remains after we exclude all £-definable sets A with p(A) < c(A). To prove that T(p) + 0, we will prove that for every n, after excluding n such sets, the remainder Tn has a measure > 1-6.
Thus, the limit set T(p) -after excluding (countably many) definable sets for which p(A) < c(A) -will also have measure
APPENDIX
What is the relation between T(A) for different sets A? Some such properties are described in [8] ; here is one more. Proposition 5. Let U be the set of all real numbers, and let T be a mapping that maps every L-definable non-empty subset A C U into a non-empty set T(A) of typical elements w. r t. A. Then there exist non-empty sets A, B, and Cfor which A C B, T(B) C C, and T(A) Z C.
Proof. Let B = [0, 11] . As a sequence B?l, let us take B,, (0, 1/n). This is a L1-definable monotonic sequence with the empty intersection, so, due to our Definition, there exists an integer N for which BN n T(B) = 0. Hence, for A = AN and C= B\BN, we have A C B, T(B) C B\BN = C, but T(A) C A = BN and therefore T(A) n C = 0. Q.E.D. Comment. A natural interpretation of a commonsense statements like "normally, A implies B" is that typical elements of A have the property B, i.e., that T(A) C B. It is well known that such commonsense implication is sometimes not transitive: e.g., penguins (A) are birds (B), birds normally fly (C), but penguins do not normally fly. Our proposition proves that the existence of a non-transitivity example is not accidental: it follows from the very definition of typicality.
